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Abstract. In a number of rulings, the German Federal Constitutional Court has called on the legislature to show 
consistency, and has declared null and void statutes which it considered to be inconsistent. This “principle of 
consistency” helps to strengthen the rationality of the law, at least as a reflex, but also to fortify the position of 
the Federal Constitutional Court within the structure of the constitutional bodies. It focuses on the self-obligation 
of the legislature: It is to be tied to a selected regulatory concept to such a degree that any deviation is to be 
classified as contradictory, and hence at the same time as unconstitutional. The paper portrays the development 
of the constitutional court case-law on the “principle of consistency”, and then goes on to criticise it vehemently: 
Firstly, a “principle of consistency” confuses the relative standard of equality rights with the absolute standard of 
freedom rights. Secondly, it causes the law to transform from an object into a yardstick for constitutional review, 
thereby turning it into a standard reviewing itself. Thirdly, the “principle of consistency” helps to radicalise the 
legal system because political consistency is now required where practical concordance was previously called 
for. However inconsistent proportionate legislation may at times be, consistent legislation tends to be 
disproportionate. Fourthly, it remains unclear how the regulatory or protective concept of a statute can be 
determined which is to serve as a standard for the law as a whole. Fifthly, and finally, the separation of powers 
between the legislature and the Federal Constitutional Court stands opposed to the idea of a principle of 
consistency. Democratic legislation is always also inconsistent legislation. A principle of consistency may 
therefore only be understood as an item on the political and legislative wishlist, but not as a principle underlying 
the rule of law. 
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In a number of rulings, the German Federal Constitutional Court has called on the legislature 
to show consistency, and has declared null and void statutes which it considered to be 
inconsistent. In addition to collision rules derived from the system of federal competences and 
from the democracy principle, as well as from the primarily rule-of-law-based topos of 
ensuring that the legal system is free from contradictions, a further element is now evident in 
recent case-law in the shape of a “principle of consistency”. This principle  helps to 
strengthen the rationality of the law, but also to fortify the position of the Federal 
Constitutional Court within the structure of the constitutional bodies. This “principle of 
 
 
consistency” focuses on the self-obligation of the legislature as much as it ties the legislature 
to a selected regulatory concept to such a degree that any deviation can be classified as 
contradictory, and hence unconstitutional. 
The current chapter charts the development of the principle of consistency within 
constitutional court case-law, and then goes on to criticise it vehemently on the following 
grounds: First, a “principle of consistency” confuses the relative standard of equality rights 
with the absolute standard of freedom rights, and, second, it causes the law to become a 
yardstick for constitutional review, thereby turning it into a standard reviewing itself. It 
consequently enables the legislature at the same time to exert an influence on this standard. 
Third, the “principle of consistency” helps to radicalise the legal system because political 
consistency is now required where practical concordance was previously called for. However 
inconsistent proportionate legislation may at times be, consistent legislation tends to be 
disproportionate. Fourth, it remains unclear how the regulatory or protective concept of a 
statute can be determined which is to serve as a standard for the law as a whole. The burden 
of explanation and reasoning cannot make the situation any clearer here because it cannot be 
determined in the political-pluralist genesis of the law who the responsible legislator actually 
is. It furthermore remains unresolved whether it is the wording of the law or the grounds for a 
statute that should serve as the yardstick for consistency. Fifth, and finally, the separation of 
powers between the legislature and the Federal Constitutional Court stands opposed to the 
idea of a principle of consistency. Strictly speaking, it is not the law that becomes a standard 
review itself, but its interpretation by the Federal Constitutional Court. As the review gains in 
depth, the risk grows that the Federal Constitutional Court will hand down rulings which are 
reserved for the legislature, particularly since, in a Senate comprised of eight legal experts, 
rationality aspects based on the rule of law have always played a more prominent role than 
democratically-decided prioritisation. 
1 Recent rulings 
In many recent rulings, the Federal Constitutional Court requires the legislature to be 
consistent. The headnotes of the ruling on the Bavarian State Lottery Act 
(Staatslotteriegesetz) for example read as follows: 
“A state monopoly on sports betting shall only be deemed to be compatible with the 
fundamental right freely to choose an occupation or profession stipulated by Art. 12 
 
 
para. 1 of the Basic Law if it is consistently orientated towards the goal of combating the 
dangers of addiction.”1 
In the view of the Federal Constitutional Court, the Act was not so orientated given that it 
remained unclear how a state monopoly could restrict betting fervour and combat betting 
addiction if, at the same time, the State had a considerable fiscal interest in offering 
monopolised sports betting, and hence could succumb to the temptation to use, and even 
misuse, its monopoly in such a way as to not only restrict betting fervour, but also to ensure a 
steady revenue stream. Were the State however not to consistently implement the concept of 
restricting betting fervour and combating betting addiction, it would actually not be justified 
in completely excluding private providers from offering sports betting. 
In another ruling on the protection of non-smokers in Baden-Württemberg and Berlin, the 
Federal Constitutional Court again demanded consistent legislation albeit this time in 
somewhat different wording: 
“If the legislature, given its particular latitude, has decided on a specific assessment of the 
potential risk, assessed the interests concerned on this basis and selected a regulatory 
concept, it must also pursue this ruling consistently. Risk assessments are not conclusive 
if different weights are allotted to identical risks in the same Act.”2 
What did the Federal Constitutional Court mean by this? In order to obtain a better 
understanding, let us briefly call to mind that the Land legislatures have not issued an 
absolute smoking ban for pubs and restaurants, but rather they have provided exceptions from 
the smoking ban for separate adjoining rooms and for outdoor catering. Having said that, it is 
not possible for factual reasons for all pubs and restaurants to benefit from such legal 
exceptions. The qualified ban contained in the non-smoker protection laws therefore has had 
the effect of an absolute ban for those pubs and restaurants, and for such “corner pubs”. The 
accusation which the Federal Constitutional Court has levelled at the legislature, and which 
has led to rulings on the unconstitutionality of the law, emanates from the fact that the health 
hazards caused by passive smoking took on a different weight in the weighing up process vis-
à-vis the right of innkeepers freely to choose their occupation or profession.  
                                                 
1 BVerfGE 115, 276 (headnotes & 310). 
2 BVerfG NJW 2008, 2409 (2415). 
 
 
To put it figuratively: the legislature had not sufficiently considered all aspects of the  
protection of life and health, even though this would have been possible in terms of the 
Constitution given that the protection of the population from dangers to life and limb 
constitutes a prominently important, common and good-related interest. Rather, it balanced it 
up opposing interests, such as the right of innkeepers freely to choose their occupation or 
profession and the right of smokers to pursue a pastime – rights that are both protected by the 
general freedom of action. And as an outcome of this process of weighing up, the legislature 
decided to allow exceptions – a decision which appeared not only to be constitutionally 
unobjectionable, but which brought about a practical concordance between several 
contradictory fundamental right positions in a practically exemplary way. The Federal 
Constitutional Court, however, concluded from this equalisation that the legislature had only 
in a limited way pursued the protection of life and limb. And for this reason the legislature 
should be permitted to take into consideration only this reduced weight when weighing up 
health protection against the interests of operators of one-room pubs and discotheques – 
anything else was said to be incoherent, inconsistent, and hence disproportionate and 
unconstitutional. 
In particular, therefore, the ruling on non-smoker protection raises the question of whether 
there are constitutional principles of coherence and consistency, disregard for which leads to 
laws being unconstitutional. 
Were this indeed to be the case, a whole number of further statutory provisions would be 
unconstitutional because of inconsistency. An example that one might mention is the 
provisions contained in the German Freedom of Information Act 
(Informationsfreiheitsgesetz). This Act provides as a matter of principle every citizen with the 
entitlement to obtain all their personal data that is available to the administration. However, 
this fundamental right of access is in turn restricted by a number of exceptions. For instance, 
in accordance with section 5 of the Act, access to personal data may only be granted where 
the applicant’s interest in obtaining the information outweighs the third party’s protected 
interests warranting preclusion from access to the information, or where the third party has 
provided his or her consent. In other words, a process of weighing up takes place between the 
interests of the data subject, which – in terms of fundamental rights – is protected by the right 
to informational self-determination, and the applicant’s interest in the information. By 
contrast, in accordance with section 6 of the Freedom of Information Act, business or trade 
 
 
secrets are always precluded from the right of access to information without there being a 
need in individual cases for any weighing up. This is already inconsistent in the sense that the 
right to informational self-determination is more closely linked to human dignity than is the 
protection of business or trade secrets, so that as such this right would require more intensive 
protection. However, according to the prevalent constitutional understanding, the 
configuration of different levels of protection can still fall within the freedom of the 
legislature to shape legislation. Things would look different were one to apply the principle of 
consistency to exemption clauses. One could then argue that it would be  inconsistent to lend 
primacy to the interest in gaining access with regard to personal data than with regard to 
business or trade secrets, so that the provisions would be unconstitutional in this regard. 
 
2 Consistency and freedom from contradictions in the 
legal system 
If the intention is therefore to examine whether inconsistent laws are always also 
unconstitutional, the subject-matter of the investigation must be initially restricted and 
delimitated. There is, for example, a need to delimitate the principle of consistency, with its 
demand for laws that are coherent and consistent, from the freedom from contradiction of the 
legal system as a whole. 
Contradictions in the overall legal system can be differentiated and systematised according to 
a variety of different criteria. A distinction is, for instance, made in jurisprudence between the 
following: 
• technical legislative contradictions which arise as a result of non-uniform linguistic usage, 
and particularly from an uncoordinated use of terms; 
• conflicting regulations where two provisions create different legal consequences for the 
same offence; 
• contradictions of values where new provisions neglect the values underlying the 
applicable law;  
 
 
• teleological contradictions which occur when the achievement of the purpose pursued by a 
provision is prevented by other provisions; 
• and contradictions between principles, i.e. between the fundamental principles that are 
relevant to a provision.3 
This will not be pursued further at this point. The vital issue is to stress the difference 
between contradictions between laws and inconsistencies within laws. 
2.1 Contradictions between laws within the legal system 
2.1.1 Collision rules 
Contradictions between laws are largely remedied with the aid of the rules on collision. Such 
contradictions can for instance occur in relation to the legal acts of other public authorities, 
such as in the relationship between Land law and Federal law, or in a comparison between the 
law of Member States and EU law. Attempts are made to avoid such contradictions by 
attributing competences as precisely as possible and otherwise to resolve them via “lex 
superior derogat legi inferiori” reasoning – according to which higher-ranking law prevails 
over lower-ranking law. 
Contradictions between laws can however also occur between legal acts emanating from the 
same public authority. The lex specialis or the lex posterior principle is applied here. 
The legal nature of these conflict resolution rules may be controversial. They are 
characterised in some cases as general legal principles, as interpretation rules, as legally-
logical principles or as presumption rules.4 What is decisive is, ultimately, the question of 
whether they are legally binding. In this regard, at least for the lex superior rule, it is possible 
to invoke Art. 1 para. 3 and Art. 20 para. 3, as well as Art. 31 and Art. 93 para. 1 No. 2 of the 
Basic Law, which virtually constitute the entire national hierarchy of statutes. And with 
regard to the lex posterior rule, it is possible to refer to the principle of democracy, which 
would be insignificant if subsequent generations were unable to change the rules of previous 
ones. 
                                                 
3 cf. on the following Müller, 2006, pp. 175. 
4
 cf. the summary in Vranes, ZaöRV 65 (2005), 391 (393). 
 
 
2.1.2 Freedom from contradictions in the legal system 
The Federal Constitutional Court for a time juxtaposed the topos of freedom from 
contradictions in the legal system with the collision rules. In accordance with the relevant 
ruling, waste charges under Land law and municipal packaging taxes, because of their 
steering function, contradicted the cooperation principle which the Federal legislature 
stipulated as a fundamental decision in the Federal Imission Control Act (BImSchG) and in 
the Act for Promoting Closed Substance Cycle Waste Management and Ensuring 
Environmentally Compatible Waste Disposal (KrW-/AbfG). The legislature handing down tax 
legislation was not permitted to falsify the rulings for cooperative, indirect forms of steering 
made by the legislature handing down legislation on the subject-matter by means of steering 
regulations the implications of which would run counter to the cooperation principle.5 As far 
as one can tell, this legal figure has however not been taken up by the Federal Constitutional 
Court since then, or at least not to the degree as to make it decisive in a dispute. 
2.2 Consistency within laws 
There is little benefit to be gained from discussing further consistency between laws given 
that the principle of consistency – at least as it is described in the ruling on non-smoker 
protection – is not concerned with the freedom from contradiction in the overall legal system, 
but – much more modestly – merely about the consistency of a single statute. If not the entire 
legal system, at least each statute should be intrinsically consistent. 
The principle of consistency is nothing new. Already in first volume of the collection of its 
rulings, the Federal Constitutional Court ask 
“whether specific provisions of a certain Act [on the reorganisation of the Länder Baden, 
Württemberg-Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern] are contradict one antoher, and 
hence [are] null and void.”6 
The causality expressed in the wording, “contradict one another, and hence [are] null and 
void” voices the actual question: is inconsistent legislation per se null and void? The Federal 
Constitutional Court did not have to answer this question at that time and the first 
                                                 
5 Taken up once more, but found not to be decisive to the dispute, is the principle of freedom from contradictions 
in the legal system in BVerfGE 116, 164 (186). 
6 BVerfGE 1, 15 (45). 
 
 
Reorganisation Act (Neugliederungsgesetz) was found null and void for other reasons. The 
court did subsequently find a multi-faceted answer to this question, however. 
Before we go on to discuss this a second ruling should first of all be mentioned, also from the 
first volume, in which the Federal Constitutional Court made fundamental statements on the 
shaping of the election law. According to these statements, which remain valid today, the 
Basic Law, in the underlying case of the then Land Statute for Schleswig-Holstein, leaves it 
up to the legislature to arrange electoral law according to the principle of majority voting or 
proportional representation. [...] Within each stage of the election [however] consistency must 
prevail.” It was hence said to be inappropriate to justify unequal utilisation of the votes in the 
balancing of the proportion of votes by arguing that the parties would be placed at a quite 
different disadvantage in a majority vote.7  
This wording, firstly, sets the basic pattern which is also expressed in Goethe’s saying, “In the 
first we are free, in the second slaves to the act.” The principle of consistency reveals itself in 
this regard as a typical type of self-binding on the part of the legislature.8 Secondly, however, 
it is already stated here that the principle of consistency does not apply in absolute terms, but 
is obviously not breached if adequate de facto reasons justify not complying with it.  
In later rulings, the Federal Constitutional Court applied the principle of consistency to 
highly-varied fields of law, including to social insurance law, the law on unemployment 
assistance and to economic law, and made it more specific in doing so. On the one hand, the 
Federal Constitutional Court enhanced the significance of the principle of consistency by 
making clear that if the legislature did not consistently hold on to a principle once it had been 
selected, it was said to breach the inherent rules which it itself had determined. On the other 
hand, however, the Federal Constitutional Court weakened the significance of the principle of 
consistency in that it attenuated the question that was raised in the first volume as to the 
consequences of a systemic caesura. Systemic caesuras – understood as breaches of the 
principle of consistency – are said not to be simply non-permissible and not to always lead to 
unconstitutionality, but to indicate only a case of unequal arbitrariness. In other words, they 
trigger an obligation to justify, but they also provide an opportunity to justify. 
                                                 
7 BVerfGE 1, 208 (246). 
8 cf. on this Meßerschmidt, 2000, pp. 30. 
 
 
2.3 Justice of the system; consistency of the system 
This understanding of the principle of consistency was also prevalent in the literature which 
prepared the way for  the concept of systematic consistency, and which commented on it over 
a period of several decades. Later, released from the burden of the term “justice”, only the 
term ‘systematic consistency’ was used. 
It was Canaris in particular who played a vital role in this process. He did not leave the “ideal 
of the century” of the great unity of all legal rules and terms – as had been developed in the 
nineteenth century from the civilistic dogma – as a general scientific and theoretical, 
hermeneutic postulate, but linked it with the constitutional tying of the legislature to the 
principle of equality.9 In his view, a system caesura will as a rule constitute a breach of the 
constitutional principle of equality. 10  The consequence is that statutory contradictions of 
values were understood not merely as constituting a disturbance in terms of legal theory and 
legislation, as an object of interpretation skills or as postulates of legal policy, but were also 
penalised with the sanctions applying to unconstitutionality, and hence as a matter of 
principle were declared null and void. 
Other renowned authors also devoted themselves to the topos of consistency. Forsthoff for 
instance spoke of the legal obligation incumbent on the State to remain consistent, and 
Denninger derived from the principle of equality a conditional constitutional mandate in the 
sense of “in for a penny, in for a pound”, i.e. one might as well undertake the whole job, as 
just a part of it. 
The question arose sooner or later in all these debates of whether the concept of consistency 
took on a substance going beyond that of the general principle of equality. This principle of 
equality, given that it was both founded in the rule of law and guaranteed in terms of 
fundamental rights, demanded with binding constitutional force, that – as a matter of principle 
– the legislature must regulate identical circumstances equally and may not arrange 
differences arbitrarily. In this regard it is necessary to stress that Canaris, as with the Federal 
Constitutional Court, also considered the violation of the principle of equality to lie in the 
violation of the ban on arbitrariness. It was not overlooked that the Basic Law provides a 
subjectively-demandable fundamental right to equal treatment in the shape of the general 
                                                 
9 cf. the assessment of Battis, in: Stödter/Thieme (eds.), Festschrift für Hans Peter Ipsen, 1977, p. 11 (15). 
10 Canaris, 1969, p. 128. 
 
 
principle of equality which prohibits arbitrarily treating as unequal that which is essentially 
equal – this prohibition also, and in particular, applies to the legislature. In this regard, the 
question always arose as to whether the principle of consistency was able to lend itself to the 
general principle of equality, which initially was simply a ban on arbitrariness, a new and 
more precise standard. 
2.4 Fiscal law 
This was and is the case in fiscal law, where the principle of consistency assumed, and 
continues to have, particular significance. In addition to the principle of ability to pay, as a 
rule it is used as a constitutional standard by which taxable events must be measured. This is 
understandable but it is also, however, surprising. It is understandable in the sense that fiscal 
law suggests system-transcendental comparisons at the intersection between public and 
private law. It is surprising in the sense that one may ask oneself which system underlies fiscal 
law that should be realised consistently. It is sufficient to be a taxpayer, and not a fiscal law 
specialist, to realise that the applicable fiscal law has no system whatsoever 11 . Cynics 
therefore also claim that the entirety of fiscal law would have to be declared unconstitutional 
if one were to apply the concept of consistency to it. 
Fiscal law indeed offers numerous examples of inconsistent legislation, in particular in the 
fields of transport and consumer taxes.12 The fact that there is still a coffee tax, but no longer 
a tea tax, might be just about acceptable but there are no obvious reasons why coffee, on the 
one hand, is taxed by this special consumption tax, whilst on the other hand it is only taxed at 
the reduced rate of value-added tax, i.e. 7%.  
This one example admittedly does not hold up where there are inconsistencies between the 
various taxes and different laws, so that the principle of consistency does not apply with 
regard to the requirement of applying it only to a single statute. However, firstly, 
distinguished figures demand that in fiscal law consistent derivations should be permitted 
across different taxes 13 , and secondly there are also examples where the principle of 
                                                 
11
 Accurately Battis, (footnote 9), p. 11 (18). 
12
 cf. for instance Tipke, 2008, pp. 9. 
13
 Tipke (footnote 12), p. 9 (23). 
 
 
consistency, related to an individual tax or tax exemption, has led to unconstitutionality. The 
declaration of nullity of the newly-worded commuter tax allowance is one such example: 
“The general exclusion of these travel expenses from the element of work-related 
expenses while ordering that the costs for distances from 21 kilometres onwards be treated 
“like” work-related expenses and assessing a mileage allowance for it which is unrelated 
to expenditure actually incurred is characterised by a contradictory connection and 
interlinking of different regulatory contents and objectives, and is not based on a 
comprehensive concept.”14  
This ruling hints at two different issues. The first is that it indicates a collateral problem of the 
principle of consistency, namely that it makes it more difficult for the legislature to deviate 
from a concept once it has been selected. I will come back to this. The ruling, however, goes 
on to also make clear the particular consequences of the connection between the principle of 
consistency and the general principle of equality; the commuter tax allowance failed due to 
the inconsistent application of the factory gate principle, because of the unequal treatment of 
the first 20 kilometres of the journey to work and of journeys above this. Had the legislature 
been more courageous and abolished the commuter tax allowance altogether, this would not 
have led to unconstitutionality in this regard. 
3 Consistency as a constitutional principle 
Despite the particular significance of the principle of consistency in fiscal law, the question 
arises whether the principle of consistency is a general constitutional principle, with the 
consequence that compliance with it can be reviewed by the Federal Constitutional Court and 
its violation can lead to the unconstitutionality of the law in question. 
3.1 Consistency as a general legal principle 
The principle of consistency is understood to a certain degree as a general legal principle. 
Reference is made here to the figure of the “venire contra factum proprium”, and a ban on 
contradictory conduct on the part of the legislature is also arrived at, a “venire contra factum 
proprium legislatoris”15. 
                                                 
14  BVerfGE 122, 210 (230). 
15
 Positioning himself as a sceptic, Lerche (1961, p. 273) regards the small number of possible (extreme) cases 
as being adequately covered by the principle of predictability. 
 
 
Admittedly, there are considerable reservations when it comes to basing far-reaching 
obligations on the legislature on an undetermined general legal principle, and thereby further 
restricting the principle of democracy beyond the written constitution. In this regard, it may 
be possible to derive parallels with, and political postulates from comparisons with, the ban 
on contradictory conduct; this cannot however lead to the establishment of a constitutionally 
binding effect. 
3.2 The principle of the rule of law 
Insofar as the principle of consistency aims to bring about adequate determinateness and legal 
certainty, it is furthermore subsumed under the principle of the rule of law. Lerche, who 
played a major role in establishing this school of thought, is primarily concerned in his much 
consulted book “Übermaß und Verfassungsrecht” (Excess and Constitutional Law) with the 
concept of predictability, and also demands consistency from the legislature in the sense that a 
sudden change of track towards another guideline could be constitutionally questionable. At 
the same time, however, he also warned that neither every legislature of the moment may be 
bound by the ideas of its predecessors, nor that considerations of expediency may 
indiscriminately advance to become legal issues.16 
3.4 Consistency as a standard of equality rights 
The principle of consistency is predominantly understood as an expression or part of the 
general principle of equality, the question being unresolved, however, as to the degree to 
which it enriches it or lends it concrete form. A ruling from 1959 with regard to the question 
of whether headache tablets may be sold in drugstores contains the following wording: 
“It is left up to the legislature whether to take action against advertising for medicines, or 
to restrict their sale, in order to combat medicine abuse, or to take both measures. If it 
restricts itself to a ban on sales, at best it may not act entirely consistently, but certainly 
not arbitrarily.”17 
The Federal Constitutional Court had to rule in the same year on the permissibility of the age 
limit for midwives. It ruled at that time: 
                                                 
16
 Lerche (footnote 15), p. 272. 
17
 BVerfGE 9, 73 (81). 
 
 
“If the law ensures [...] a minimum standard of midwifery services, it is legitimate that it 
also attempts to fully guarantee the ability of midwives to perform, an age limit being one 
way to achieve this. The principle of equality then does not force one to either restrict this 
guarantee by foregoing the age limit or to extend it to include midwifery provided by 
physicians, even if such an extension would make the provision for good legislation more 
perfect.”18 
This wording makes it clear that the Federal Constitutional Court did not initially regard 
consistency as constituting a constitutional standard, but in fact only the ban on arbitrariness 
was applied as a constitutional standard. As has already been stated, the Federal 
Constitutional Court later at least regarded inconsistent legislation as constituting an 
indication of the a violation of the general principle of equality. 
With the “New Formula” in 1980 the Federal Constitutional Court increased the value of the 
principle of consistency to a certain extent from a dogmatic point of view. According to the 
New Formula, if a statutory system is violated, and if this violation takes on a certain 
intensity, it can only be justified by interests related to the common good which are 
appropriate in proportion to the unequal treatment.19 
3.5 Consistency as a standard for freedom rights 
If the principle of consistency is therefore attributed as such to the general right to equality, 
the particular significance of the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on non-smoker 
protection is explained. This significance lies in the fact that the principle of consistency was 
not applied – as in fiscal law – within the scope of the right to equality, but as a standard in 
reviewing a freedom right, namely the right freely to choose an occupation or profession, and 
that -ultimately- it has even caused a provision to be ruled unconstitutional. 
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 BVerfGE 9, 338 (353). 
19
 BVerfGE 55, 72 (88): “Accordingly, this fundamental right [Art. 3 para. 1 of the Basic Law] is violated above 
all if a group of addressees of the provision is treated differently from other addressees of the provision although 
no differences of such a nature and weight exist between the two groups such that they could justify the unequal 
treatment (cf. BVerfGE 22, 387 [415]; 52, 277 [280]). The Federal Constitutional Court in fact emphasised the 
regulatory content of Art. 3 para. 1 of the Basic Law in connection with attempts to derive from the legislature 
inherent rules made by the law itself that is binding on the legislature and to complain about the fact of being 
incompatible with the system as a violation of the principle of equality (BVerfGE 34, 103 [105]).“ (author’s 
emphasis). cf. also BVerfGE 46, 97 (107 ff.). Further Stern, in: Stern, Staatsrecht, III/2, § 96 IV 9, p. 1830: “All 
in all, the principle of equality is intended to ensure objectiveness, expedience, system constancy and 
consistency of legislative action with regard to fundamental matters.” 
 
 
We may recall that the violation of the Constitution was founded not on a violation of the 
right to equality, at least with regard to “corner pubs”, but on a violation of the right to freely 
choose an occupation or profession. The inconsistent weighting and, moreover, the allegedly 
inconsistent weighting of health protection, was said to lead to a lack of proportionality in the 
strict sense of the word. 
The literature reacts in various ways to the transfer of the principle of consistency to freedom 
rights, if this transfer is consciously registered at all. Similar to in the discussion on 
systematic justice and systematic consistency, two sides face one another, and the old 
arguments are brought out once more. 
Three functions are stressed in this regard which, in parallel, are considered to constitute 
advantages of the consistent application of the principle of consistency to the evaluation of 
statutes. 20 
Firstly, a consistency verification of the regulatory concept underlying a statute is called for 
particularly if this regulatory concept acts as a brake on fundamental rights and is hence in 
need of justification. No arbitrary encroachment on fundamental rights is in need of 
justification when in isolation, but a justifying effect is said to be developed only by an 
“inherently consistent overall concept”. 
What is more, a rights-affirming function also attaches to the principle (a function which 
other consider to have adverse effects). Self-contradictions are said to weaken the 
legitimatisation of the law, which is materially based on acceptance and recognition. The fact 
of ruling out inconsistent legislation by virtue of consistently observing the principle of 
consistency is said to once more strengthen confidence in the law. 
Finally, it is also considered an advantage that the combination of the ban on excessiveness 
and the principle of consistency require the legislature to provide adequate grounds in future, 
thus obliging it to be accountable both to itself and to citizens. 
To sum up, proponents of the principle will presumably recognise a general principle of 
consistency as constituting a major step towards “rationality as a standard of legislation”21. In 
                                                 
20
 Lindner, ZG 2007, 188 (195). 
21




this sense, “freedom from contradiction in terms of wording and values”22 is identified as a 
criterion for rational legislation. The doctrine of good legislation,23 the obligation to enact 
good laws,24 also accommodates these criteria.  
4 Objections to a transfer to freedom rights 
Considerable doubts are however justified vis-à-vis the almost joyful consent to rulings of the 
Federal Constitutional Court, as they ignore the political aspect of democratic legislation. The 
transfer of the principle of consistency from equality rights to freedom rights, the 
consideration of this principle when weighing up individual interests protected by 
fundamental rights, and the politically-defined interest of the public good carried out within 
the review of proportionality, are to be vigorously rejected. Six reservations, in particular, 
may be put forward and which can be seen to some degree in the dissenting opinions of 
judges Bryde and Masing (below).  
4.1 Confusion of equality and freedom rights 
Firstly, the inclusion of the principle of consistency in freedom rights blurs the distinction 
between equality and freedom rights. It hence fails to do justice to the different levels of 
protection granted by the different types of fundamental right. Whilst equality rights in fact 
only offer relative protection, freedom rights offer absolute protection. 
Whilst such dogmatic reservations alone should normally not be decisive, the distinction 
between equality and freedom rights nonetheless also, and in fact especially, manifests itself 
in the consequences of the finding of unconstitutionality. Whilst, as a rule, violations of 
freedom rights lead to the nullification of statutes, the Federal Constitutional Court is cautious 
when it comes to the finding of nullity because of the violation of equality rights in 
consideration of the scope of the legislature to shape legislation. As is known, the latter the 
legislature can solve a breach of equality in three different ways, i.e. by treating the 
previously badly-treated group in the same way as the better-treated one in future; by treating 
the previously better-treated group worse in future; or by treating both groups in a new 
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manner. This is also shown in the non-smoker ruling, in which the Federal Constitutional 
Court unambiguously communicated to the Land legislatures that they could also resolve the 
violation of equality by imposing an absolute smoking ban. 
Secondly, there is no need at all to tighten up the standard of the review of proportionality for 
freedom rights. The significance of the principle of consistency for the application of equality 
rights to fiscal laws is not to questioned, but at the same time there should be an awareness of 
why this significance exists: Since the Federal Constitutional Court operated for many years 
using the presumption and in some aspects still presumes, that the collection of taxes does not 
constitute an encroachment on the freedom of ownership, there simply is no adequately-
determined constitutional standard by which to evaluate the constitutionality of taxes. The 
general principle of equality can be considered as a standard, but with its arbitrariness formula 
it provides little protection against the parliament enacting the fiscal legislation. There was, 
hence, a need with the principle of consistency in fiscal law to find a more precise 
constitutional standard. But there is no need to find a more precise constitutional standard to 
other laws, to pertinent laws, considering that there is a very precise constitutional standard 
available here, namely the standard of freedom rights. 
4.3 From the object to the standard of constitutional review 
A second objection turns against the interests that are to be equalized: If the Federal 
Constitutional Court leaves it up to the legislature to determine the value and weight of the 
public interest in cases in which this interest is protected by the Constitution itself, as for 
instance with regard to the protection of life and limb of the population, the Federal 
Constitutional Court surrenders to the legislature.25 The legislature would then not only be 
able to place into perspective the objective being pursued by the provision by means of a large 
number of exceptions, thus weakening it, but conversely it could also increase its status by 
selecting a protection concept that was as stringent and uncompromising as possible, which 
would then be self-supporting. 
It is then only a short step from the constitutionality of statutes to the lawfulness of the 
Constitution. In this regard Masing, who considered in a dissenting opinion that the 
constitutional weight of health protection is not a consequence of statutory values, but in fact 
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creates their standard, may be concurred with.26 Otherwise, the principle of consistency would 
have considerable potential to place freedom at risk. 
If, for instance in the sports betting judgment, the review of proportionality in the strict sense 
failed because the law lacked the consistency needed to achieve its objective, this can, 
conversely, also be read such that a provision is always (and already) proportionate in the 
strict sense only if the purpose is pursued consistently. The Federal Constitutional Court does 
not carry out any weighing up at all in the ruling between the interest that is placed at a 
disadvantage by the objective-achieving measure – in this case the interests of a private sports 
betting provider – and the objective to be achieved – the fight against betting addiction. 
Rather, it replaces the principle of proportionality in the stricter sense with the figure which is 
indifferent in terms of weighing up, i.e. the consistent pursuance of the objective.27 
This consideration is admittedly only theoretical, and – probably incorrectly – draws 
conclusions as well as reverse conclusions from an individual ruling to possible future 
rulings. However, the risk of too strongly emphasising the objective in the framework of 
reasonableness cannot be dismissed. If the principle of consistency were to be included in the 
review of proportionality at all, it makes more sense to, for instance, locate it at the first level, 
for example at the level of  the suitability of resources. Firstly, it is the encroachments on 
fundamental rights, that is the means, which are reviewed for their consistency, and secondly 
the possibility remains within the framework of necessity and suitability for correcting the 
outcomes of the weighing up process. 
4.3 The radicalisation of the legal system 
Probably the strongest objection to the transfer of the principle of consistency to freedom 
rights lies in their potentially radicalising effect. This idea was in the obiter dictum of the 
ruling, according to which an absolute smoking ban is said to be constitutional but not the 
graduated concept. 
It can however also be expressed, somewhat exaggeratedly, in the hypothesis that the 
inclusion of the principle of consistency in the review of proportionality calls for political 
consistency where practical concordance was previously called for. If proportionate 
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legislation is inconsistent, as in the case of the non-smoking laws, then consistent legislation 
tends to be disproportionate. 
Also put somewhat exaggeratedly, the consistency principle focuses too much on the 
consequences, that is on the second step. What is the point of being consistent or, in other 
words, what is the point of being correct in terms of the logical conclusion, if the premise is 
wrong? “Wrong but consistent” in this regard seems to come closer to the principle of 
consistency than “correct but inconsistent”.28 
4.4 The concrete purpose 
To address a fourth objection, which is not quite so serious, it is therefore decisive) that the 
first step be precisely examined, given that, according to the principle of consistency, it 
operates as a standard for the second step. Adjudging the protective concept of a statute 
however causes considerabe problems. With all due respect for majority voting in a collegial 
panel of judges, the two dissenting opinions of judges Bryde and Masing show how difficult 
reaching a consensus decision can be. The Federal Constitutional Court was furthermore also 
not able to do so, as will be shown below. 
The literature considers tightening up the burden of proof and the obligations incumbent on 
the legislature to provide grounds in order to make the system and the first step easier to 
understand, which then serves as a standard of consistency. 
There is however room for doubt here. Firstly, the legislature is tempted, and would also be 
well advised, to secure its rulings via several grounds, that is in a multi-final way. It must do 
so because, unlike the administration in some cases – it cannot subsequently provide 
reasoning for its rulings. This is already frequently the rule, given that it is not always simple 
to crystallise the actual motives for a statutory provision.  
Such obligations to provide grounds however do not hold up. There has also been 
disagreement in this regard for quite some time as to whether, to what degree and with what 
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consequences a statute must be reasoned. That the legislature owes nothing but the law, and 
thus in particular that it does not have to provide grounds, is one of the extreme positions put 
forward in this regard. On the other hand, there are legal policy demands for obligatory 
reasoning that would be far-reaching, in some cases constituting criminal offences. There is 
no contesting the fact that such grounds are expedient and may also take on constitutional 
significance in particular to determine legislative competence and to adjudge proportionality. 
The problem, however, starts with the question of who actually is the legislature and who is it 
that must therefore provide grounds for the law, and continues with the question of what is the 
standard of consistency – the wording of the law or the grounds of the law In any case, the 
grounds may not advance so far as to set the standard for the wording of the law. 
Even though grounds may be welcome for this reason, they will contribute little towards the 
desired clarity for statutory purposes. In a  possible examination by the Federal Constitutional 
Court, the singular purpose or the plural objectives of a statute are left to interpretation by the 
Court. It is then the wording of the law that remains decisive, as is also proven by the 
judgment on the non-smoker protection laws. The two Land statutes which have so far been 
reviewed state in their grounds the effective protection of the life and limb of non-smokers, 
but nevertheless, the Federal Constitutional Court reads from the individual statutory 
provisions a relativized protection concept. 
4.5 The separation of powers 
A fifth argument may be otlined at this juncture29 – it relates to the separation of powers 
between the legislation and the Federal Constitutional Court. The principle of consistency 
tends to amplify the density of review of the Federal Constitutional Court, and increases the 
danger of the Federal Constitutional Court promoting itself to become an ersatz legislature. 
This danger is all the greater given that it will be much simpler for a panel made up of eight 
judges to design a cohesive overall concept for a statute, or at least to advertise it as such, than 
is the case in democratic decision-making in legislative bodies. Since, furthermore, all its 
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members are lawyers, rule-of-law rationality aspects will certainly be more likely to play a 
role here than democratic determinations of priority. 
4.6 The principle of democracy 
The democracy principle is the final argument put forward in the shape of the hypothesis that 
democratic legislation is inconsistent legislation. 
This result does not yet emerge from the principle of a limited period of governance since the 
principle of consistency has (so far) been applied within statutes and, as a rule, does not cover 
any legislation lasting more than one parliament.30 It also does not emerge per se from the 
fundamental concept of democratic legislation given that democratic primacy, too, is 
governance that is tied into the constitutional state. Democratic legislation is not free, it is 
bound by the Constitution and it is above all subject to fundamental rights.  
In reality, the result that democratic legislation is inconsistent legislation emerges from the 
essence of democratic legislation and from its concrete development. Contradictions in 
statutes are in fact frequently the outcome of compromises, and compromises are a sign of 
democratic legislation.31 Any assertion, in contrast, that democratic legitimisation does not 
constitute an empowerment to hand down irrational rulings32, does not hold up. Rationality is 
not a standard for evaluating democratically-legitimated rulings, or at least not a legal one. If 
the legislature’s political latitude for action is not to be restricted even further, rationality 
requirements over and above constitutional ties should only be attached to legislative activity 
extremely cautiously. The scope for political design is in any case already restricted by a 
European and a global flow of regulation. If in this interdependent relationship between the 
various regulatory levels additional rationality wishes are enriched with legal obligations, not 
only the democratic design process is paralysed, but the law conversely also runs the risk of 
losing its binding effect for a lack of practical enforceability. In this regard, the principle of 
consistency can and should be understood as politically and logistically desirable in terms of 
policy and legislation, but not as a rule-of-law principle. The ambition of the inventive spirit 
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of jurisprudence and constitutional case-law should be reigned in, and should focus more 
closely on recognising the political dimension of democratic legislation. 
Klaus Meßerschmidt observes on this that “scholarly creativity [...] is frequently proven by 
the refinement of constitutional law, frequently also via theories which culminate in an 
intensification of the constitutional commitment of the legislature to the Constitution”.33 A 
constitutional principle of consistency would hence be a further example of a theory, a 
doctrine which “tends more to prevent than to open up the scope for political action”.34 This is 
all the more serious given that a consistent principle of consistency would have a highly-
preservative effect  not only for a new statute, but in particular also for any legal amendments. 
This is because the principle of consistency makes it more difficult for the legislature to leave 
a course once it has been set and to change direction. In the concrete case of the Non-Smokers 
Act, Masing also points beyond legal considerations to the fact that stipulations of 
consistency in fact stipulate market forces.35 
5 The significance of the premises for consistency 
Anyone who is bound by the second step should consider the first. This is the structure of the 
principle of consistency. It however also applies to the Federal Constitutional Court. Unlike 
the ruling quoted from the first volume, the Federal Constitutional Court was not clever 
enough to recognise that the issue of consistency is first and foremost also a matter of the 
premise.36 It thus based its ruling on an incorrect assessment of the Non-Smokers Act.  
In order to explain this it is necessary to refer once more to the image of weighted interests 
since this can help to illustrate where the error of the ruling of the Federal Constitutional 
Court lies. The Court accuses the legislature of allotting different evaluations to the protection 
of life and limb within the same statute; it was said not to throw the full weight onto the scales 
for this extremely important community asset, but used only a very limited version of the 
notion. 
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This presumption is however not correct. The legislature particularly did not? (does not) 
presume a reduced weight of health protection, but assigned to it the full weight allotted by 
the Constitution. The reduced weight is a result only of the weighing up with contrasting 
interests; it is an outcome of the weighing up.37 In this sense, it is particularly not consistent to 
now place on the scales this attenuated weighting of the protection of life and limb against 
commercial interests, such as those of the landlords of one-room pubs or of discotheques. 
Rather, this new weighing up makes it necessary once more to attach the full weight to the 
protection of life and limb – and such protection would probably have very clearly asserted 
itself vis-à-vis other interests, as the Federal Constitutional Court made recognisable in an 
obiter dictum. 
What is paradoxical about the ruling is, therefore, that in order to guarantee alleged equal 
treatment regarding exceptions from the fundamental smoking ban, the Federal Constitutional 
Court itself became guilty of unequal treatment. When it comes to one-room pubs, the Federal 
Constitutinal Court attached less importance to the protection of life and limb than it did when 
considering other  kinds of pubs and restaurants. It is not the legislature that attaches differing 
degrees of importance to an identical hazard, but the Federal Constitutional Court; it is not the 
legislature’s allegedly inconsistent concept of protection which leads to the 
unconstitutionality of the law, but its incorrect evaluation by the Federal Constitutional Court. 
If the ruling is therefore an incorrect ruling, a mistaken ruling, it can be hoped that the 
Federal Constitutional Court will apply the principle of consistency without being 
consistent 38  In these terms, this article should be regarded not only as a plea for 
inconsistent legislation, but in particular also for inconsistent constitutional case-law. This 
does not question the fact that the consistency of statutes can and should be something  
that is desirable in political and legislative terms39. However, inconsistent law can and 
should only be corrected by political means on this side of a contravention of the general 
principle of equality. 
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